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Abstract. The general aim of this paper is to find a theory of concurrency combining the 
approaches of Petri and Scott (and others). 
In part I we introduce our formalisms. To connect the abstract ideas of events and domains of 
information, we show how causal nets induce certain kinds of domains where the information 
points are certain sets of events. This allows translations between the languages of net theory and 
domain theory. Foliowing the idea. that events of causal nets are occurrences, we generalise causat: 
nets to occurrence nets, by adding forwards conflict. Just as infinite flow charts unfold finite ones, so 
transition nets cdn be unfolded into occurrence nets. Next we extend the above connectious 
between ets an& domains to these new nets. Event structures which are intermediate between nets 
and domains play an important part in all our work. Finally, as an example of how concepts 
translate from one formalism to the other, we show how Petri’s notion of confusion ties up with 
Kahn and Plotkin’s concrete domains. 
In part II WC shall continue the job of connecting up notions within net theory and the theory of 
domains. In particular, we shall examine *s “2ea of states of computations. 
The motivation of the present work is the sear h for a theory of concurrency which 
incorporates, on the one hand, the insights of Petri and his school [9, lo] on events, 
causality, etc. and on the other hand the insights of Scott [12, 141 and Stoy [ 151 on 
how to give denotational semantics using domains, which are partial ordLro of 
information. The work is rather abstract in that it attempts to connect up the ideas of 
events and (partial orders of) information. We hope that attending to the main 
intuitive ideas first will lead naturally to more practical applications later. 
This paper consists of two parts. Part I which we present here has three sections. 
In Section 2, we consider causal nets [9] and show how they giv:: domains whose 
(information) points are sets of events of the nets, that have occurred by some stage 
of the process (or computation) described by the net. This correspondence allows 
arison of lattice-theoretic ;.J=as and ideas expressed in the language of 
ction 3 where we introduce 
‘..!*:rmediate structures-called ~‘ZXM structures - prove to be of use; they are like 
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nets but with the conditions removed. We hope they are of some independent 
interest. 
In both causal and occurrence nets the events are thought 0; as occurrences and the 
nets are acyclic and often infinite and describe, somehow, a process or computation. 
This contrasts with the systems approach of considering transition nets [lo] as the 
main subject of study; indeed occurrence nets can be obtained (see Proposition 4) by 
unfolding transition nets forwards from an initial marking. It is in the same spirit as 
considering infinite acyclic flow diagrams, [13], or infinite terms [2]. 
As an end to part I we give an example of the translation of concepts from one 
formalism to the other: Petri’s notion of confusion (in transition nets) is tied up with 
Kahn and Plotkin’s <oncrete domains. 
In part II we shall continue the job of connecting up notions wirhin net theory and 
the theory of domains. In particular, we shall examine the idea of states of 
computations. 
There are clearly many gaps in the present treatment. For one thinglve would like 
a better understanding of what we mean when we say that a nei. describes a 
coinputation or process. Also the ca.tegorically minded will note that we have not 
4scussed morphisms; this is particularly important for domains where the continu- 
ous functions play a major role in the denotations of programs. Fi:.tiilly we note a 
curious mismatch. We call our nets (descriptions of) processes or c amputations and 
each such net gives rise to a whole domain; on the other band, in so far B processes 
are considered i:n the lattice-theoretic approach (as in [ ) they ar:: onl; elements of 
domains. Resolution of this problem will no doubt in ve separbting and relating 
the difIero:<t uses of the word ‘process’, 
. 
e start off with an explanation of our computational interpretation of causal 
nets - the process level of net theory. To define these nets, we follow the axiomatic 
approach of Petri [9] and Best Cl]: 
. A Petri net is a triple 
is a set of conditions, 
is a set of evei6fi.8 
- FE(.B~E)u(E~ ) is the causal dependency re,!atiorz, 
satisfying 
Al nE:=g). 
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F’ is irreflexive, 
tlbl, bz F B: (‘bl= ‘b;) A (tsi = ti;) * 61’~ b2. 
There is a well-known standard graphical representation of Petri nets, which we shall 
use throughout this paper. Conditions are represented by circles: 0, and events by 
boxes: Cl. The relation F is represented by oriented arcs between circles and boxes, 
so that there is an arc from x to J iff scFy. 
sample 1, The graph in Fig. 1 represents the (causal) net N = (B, E, F), where 
~3 = (61, b2, h3, b4h 
E ={eh e2, e3,e4h 
F=I(eh bt),(el,bz),Cbl,e2),(b~,e3), le2, b3), (es, hMb3, e4i, Ib4,e4)). 
Fig. 1. 
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In [9] Petri g!ives a deeply considered discussion of causal nets and how they 
provide the foundation for general net theory. The notion of concurrency plays an 
important role in this analysis, and, as noted by Petri himself, is easily defined in the 
context of causal nets. 
For a causal net N= (B, E,F) the concurrency relation CON c 
(B u E) x (B u E’) is defined by 
CON = ((I3 u E) X (B ‘J E))\(F’u (F+)-3. 
It follows that coN is symmetrical and reflexive (from AC). It also fQllows that in 
causal nets any two elements of B u E are either causally dependent or concurrent. 
We shall not go into Petri’s careful arguments for the axioms for causal nets (based on 
the id&k behind general net thesry), but only briefly outline our intuition behind 
causa! nets as representing, computations. 
‘The events of causal nets represent occurrences of certain ‘atomic events’, and a 
s+.ate of a computation is represented by hoKings of certain conditions. An occur- 
rence of an event e is associated with a state in which all its precotlditions [*n) hold, 
and the effect of its occurrence is that all its preconditions cease to hold, and all its 
postconditions (S) begin to hoid. Furthermore, each event e is ‘caused I-,y’ a unique 
subprocess ((x EI B u E 1 xF’ e}), and ‘causes’ a unique subprocess ({x E B u 
E 1 eF’x}). (Causality is probably not the right English word in this context-necessity 
may be better.) This is not necessarily true in higher level nets, in whrch events (and 
conditions) may be repeatable, and (forwards or backwards) conflict may be present. 
As an illustration of the ideas behind these different levels, suppose we have a 
program which runs on various possible input data d, and which contains a definition 
of a procedure, P. Then we have the following possible events at process or system 
levels: 
- Prucess level: The third call of P in the run with input data d. 
- System level: Any call of P in the run with input data d. 
Any call of a procedure in the run with input data d. 
Any call of a procedure in any run of the program. 
We now focus on the pattern of occurences of events of causal nets. The relation F 
specifies a certain dependency, in the sense that if eF+e’, for e,e’ E E, then in the 
process described by the net, e’ cannot occur without e having already occurred. This 
ollowing definition of a ‘causality’ structure on events: 
3. An ekmentary evertt structure is just a partial order S = (E, G), VNhere 
- E is a set of &W~tS, and 
- G the partial order OWP the causality relations 
between causal nets and elementary event structures is obvious. 
e precise by the next two theorems. 
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Let N = (9, E, F) be a causal net. Then e[N] =&E, F” / E*) is arz 
elementi3y event strumire. 
. Only asymmetry is non-trivial, and that follows from A6. 
Let S - (E, S) be an elementary event structure (with E # 0). Then there is 
a causal net q[S] such that S = i$[v[S]]. 
roof. We construct .n[S] as N = (B, E, F), where 
B ={(e, e’jle, e’E E, e Ze’, e ~e’}u((O, e), (e, 1) 1 e 2’). 
F = {((e, e’), e’), (e, (e, e’)) 1 e, e’ E E, (e, e’) E B} . 
u {W, d, 4, k k, W [ e c El. 
Axioms Al, A3, A4, A5 and A7 are trivial; A2 follows fro:; &le assumption E f cd, 
and A6 follows from the fact that s is a partial order. It is also easy to see that 
S = 5b?lNl. 
What these two trivial theorems say is that nets have “as much” structure as 
elementary event structures (ignoring the empty event structure); nothing is lost in 
the passage S + v[S]. however, this does not work in the opposite direction, as in 
igeneral N and n[[[N]] are not isomorphic. Take the set N from Fig. 1. The 
(elementary event structure t[N] and the causal net n[t[N]] are pictured in Fig. 2. 
It should be clear from this example, that Theorem 2 holds for other definitinns of 
n -the particular one we have chosen is somehow maximal - a point we shall return 
to later. 
This raises the naturai question, whether or not it is reasonable to identify causal 
nets using the equivalence relation: 
N1 = N2 iff ([NJ =: ~[Nz]. 
From our point of view, it seems that = is an acceptable equivalence relation, 
although from a net theory point of view, it might have und’esirable properties. 
However, we press on for the mornrent with the connection between elementar,y 
event structures and Scott [12, 141 domains of information. Given an elenemary 
event structure, S = (E, =z), we want some idea of information abouz a certain set, .x, 
of events having occurred (in the process q[S]). This information can be represented 
by ihe set itself, and the intuition behind the causality relation tells us that x must be 
left-closed, where 
Let S = (E, <) be an elerne~t~~~y event str 
VeExVe’EE:e’<e=$e’Ex. 
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Fig. 2. 
So, as inf~rmatim pbt!: ~“-ic choose the left-closed subsets of E. What about the 
ordering? From the above it follows that x’ contains more information than x 
precisely when x is a subset of x’. 
J. Let S = (E, 6) be ahr elementary event structure. Then g[S] is the 
parrral order of left-closed subsets of E ordered by inclusion. 
” 
It is quite easy to characterise the structures A?[§]. The only new concept we need 
is that of prime algebraicity. 
Let P = (23, c) be a par~iz1 order. An element p E D is a complete prime 
(every finite X G D), if u X exists and y C a X, tk.4 
there exists an x E at p c x. The set of complete primes of P is denoted 5%‘~. 
) is s to be prime algebraic iff for every 
= def 
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31 the graphical representation of partial orders in Fig. 3 thi; (corn 
circled, and it is easy to see that none of these partial srdcrs are prime alg 
roposition relates the concept of prime algebraicity to 
Fig. 3. 
A complete lattice is prime algebraic iff it is algebruic and every finite 
element is a lub of complete primes. Further, such a lattice is completely distributive, 
every complete prime is finite, and an element is a complete prime iff it is completely 
irreducible. 
We now present results leading to the characterisstion of the structures JZ[S]. 
Theorem 3. Let S = (E, <_i be an elementary event structure. Then Z[S] is a prime 
algebraic complete lattice. I?s complete primes are those elementlr of the form 
[e]=dcf{e’EE]e’Ge} (eEE). 
Proof. The structure 9[S] is a complete lattice with u X = G X (and f-1 X = n X). 
Each [e] is clearly left-closed,, and ik a complek prime as if [e] E 11 X = IJ X, then 
e E [e] c U X and so for som~e x 1.n X, e E x, arid so [e] cz x. As we have A = 
u ([e J 1 e E x} for any x in aSI, each element is a lub of the complete primes below it, 
and so flS] is prime algebraic. 
Finally, if x is a complete ;xime, then as we have x = U {[e] ] e E x} we must have 
x c [e] for some e in x. But then we must have x = [e], which completes the proof. 
This theorem indicates how to map our lattices to eleme;htary event structures. 
Let P = (:9, c) be a prime algebraic complete lattice. The elementary 
event structke 91[P] is defined as (VP, c r %‘:I. 
Before stating the characterisgtion of the structures .J$S] we shali rter:d t 
following general lemma. 
Let P = (D, C) be a prime algebraic partial order. Then tk ma 
i %2,)] defined by 
e(d) =3& 62 VPIP c 
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is an or&rmonic (i.e. w(d) g Irid’) iff d E d’), itpreserves and rej?ects complete primes, 
azd preserves thlose lubs that exist in P. 
, Clearly r is monotonic. If, on the other han 
algebraicity of .r2 
d =[_j{pE ~~lp~d}=U’ITid)EUn~d’)=d”. 
Let p be a cornpleCe prime of P, then w(p) is a complete prime in %‘[(%?, c 1 Vi)] 
from Theorem 3. On the other hand, it ako follows from the theorem that if w(d) is a 
complete prime, then d is a complete prime, too. So, 7r preserves and reflects 
complete primes. Finally, if &X exists, then 
= U (p E %‘p 1 p c x} (by the definition of complete primeness) 
XEX 
= ij B.(x). 
XEX 
We shall often make use of the well-known fact that any mapping between partial 
orders which is onto and an order manic is an isomorphism. This happens in the proof 
of the next theorem., which states the very close relationship which exists between our 
lattices and event structures. 
Let S = (E, s) be an elementary evePat structure; fh6f-k S=9s[Z[S]J. 
Similarly, let P = (D, Gj be a prime algebraic complete lattice; then P 2 S[S[P]]. 
~00~~ Define p : S + 9[5!?[S]] by ly(e) = [e]. Then ly is well-defined and onto from 
Theorem 3. Furthermore, Y is easily proved to be an order mcmic, and hence it is an 
isomorphism, which proves th)e first part of the theorem. As for the second part - v 1s 
known from Lemma 1 to be an order manic; r is also onto, since for any element X of 
Z’[S[P]], ‘dpX exists (P is Y complete lattice) and 
= u T(X) (by Lemma 1) 
XEX 
= Lj {[:c] 1 x E X} (by the definition of n) 
=X. 
eed an isomo~p~is 
e eiex_naary event stau lete 
oes not lose anj structiiral 
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Fig. 4. E[L.j] 
information going from one to the other via the 2 and 9 mappings - in contrast to 
the earlier result about the relationship between causal nets and elementary event 
structures. A special case of Theorem 4 where S is finite is given in [3]. 
The framework we have set up so far, can be pictured as follows: 
We are concerned with the translation of concepts and ideas from one side of this 
diagram to the other. From right to left we get an explanation iin the framework of net 
theory of the Scott idea of information. From left to right WI: see how net concepts 
(like events and causality) translate into the idea of partial order of information. 21 
the rest of this section we shall elaborate a little on this latter translation, but before 
that a few general remarks. 
First, elementary event structures have been introduced here oniy as an inter- 
mediary technics1 device, but we do helie Y that they (and their gent:ralisations 
introduced in the next section) are interesting in their own right, and as we shall see, 
they should be a more appropriate framework for a number of questions than their 
equivalent but mare detailed lattice structures. 
Second, we have deliberately established the links between 
eory of partial orders at the process level. We strongly b&eve 
of this low lievei is necessary for a ~rsca~di~~ of si 
level concepts within the two theories. 
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And now, let US see how some of the basic concepts of net theory translate using 
the mappings $ and 3, Not surprisingly, since we specifically focussed cur attention 
on event occurrences of nets, the concb’pt cf an event translates very *47ell. From our 
construction of S[P], where B is a prime algebraic complete lattice, it seems that the 
notion of events translates into the complete primes of P. To see the intuition behind 
these primes, we shall need the notion ,>f prime intervals of partial orders. 
8. Let (D, c) be a partial order. Define the interval from d to d’, [d, d’], 
fosr d, d’~a) as 
[cl, d’] = def(d”E D 1 d r d” c d’}. 
An interval [d, d’] is said to be prime iff d # d’ and [d, d’] = (6, d’}, in which case d’ is 
said to c~uier d, which we write as d -< d’. 
With our computational interpretation in mind, prime intervalc corrzsyond to 
steps of computations or more specifically, occurrences at particular states of the 
computations. To see how this works formally, define the relatiorl s between prime 
intervals by 
[dl,d;]s[d2,di] iff di=J; Udzanddr =d’l lldz. 
Next we define the equivalence relation = between prime intervals as the 
equivalence generated by S. This relation represents the intuition behind ‘occur- 
rences of the same event’. How does this intuition tie up with the notion of complete 
primes? As a first step the following (easy to prove) propositiou gives the relation 
between prime intervals and complete primes. 
Let P = (D, E) be ta prime algebraic complete lattice. Then for any 
prime interval id, d’], n=(d’)\r(d) is a singleton. Heace if we put 
prC[d, d’l) E v(d’)\n(d), 
then pr i,s a well-defined mapping j’rom the prime intervals of P to ‘;ep. 
And the following theorem states the relation between the equivalence and the 
, c) be a prime algebraic co plete lattice; then the following 
t for pri.ve i~tervo~~ [d 1, d; 29 di 1: 
(0 I&, d+=+h 4.1, 
ere exists a prim2 i~te~~~ [ 
Cdl, d’l]a!d,, d;l+&, d;]. 
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Further, if p is a complete prime of P, then 
(1) => (2). It follows easily from the definition of G that [dr, 4, ]s [&, &] 
implies pr([dr, dI]) = pr([&, d$]j. 
(2) + (3). Define d3 = dl fl dz and dk = d’l ll d;. 
(3) + (1). Trivial. 
The last part of the theorem is obvious. 
Theorem 5 proves a one-to-one correspondence between the complete primes and 
the more intuitive equivalence classes of prime intervals. This justifies our translation 
of events into complete primes. 
Now, it is easy to see that the events of a causal net N are in one-to-one 
correspondence with the events of g[N], and the events of an elementary event 
structure S are in one-to-one correspondence with those of v[S]. On the other hand, 
the events of S are also in one-to-one correspondence with those of &?[S], and the 
ev. nts of a prime algebraic complete lattice are in one-to-one correspondence with 
thos: of PEP]. 
The situation for translation of conditions is a good deal less pleasant. Our main 
tool for handling conditions is the extensionality axiom A7, which allows us to 
identify any condition b with its pre- and postevent (‘b and b’). For simplicity, we shall 
only demonstrate how conditions translate into elementary event structures. 
A condition of an elementary event structure S is taken to be any condition of 
n[S]. By definition this gives a nice one-to-one relationship between conditions of S 
and n[S], but, obviously, it is more interesting to see how conditions of a causal net N 
correspond to certain conditions of e[N]. Define the map, bed, between these two 
sets of conditions as follows: 
((0, e’), if ‘b = ld and 6’ = {e’}, 
Vb E B: bed(b) = (e, l), 
1 
if ‘b = {e} and b’= !& 
; (e, e’j, if ‘b = {e} and b’ = {e’). 
It follows from the axioms of causal nets that bed is well defined, and that it is 
one-to-one. Nowever, in general bed will not be onto, obviously because of our 
construction of q[S], which in general generates a lot of redundant conditions. One 
could try to remedy this by a characterisation of the ‘essential’ conditions of S. The 
following lemma is such an attempt. 
et = (E, s) be an elementary event structure, and b one of its co 
Gwen the following two conditions are e 
(1) for every causal net N = ( , E, F) for which S = s[.W], b E bed\ 
(2) b = (e, e’), where e’ covers e (with respect to the rehxtion G). 
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roof. .Assume 14 of the required form, then clearly for every causal net N = 
(B, E, ,t; J for which S = [[ 1, there must exist a conP&n b’ E 
me b = bed(b’). On the other hand, if b is no1 of this for corn truct a slightly 
ed form, .N, of [,§I leaving oIlt the condition corresponding to b, such that 
S = e[N] and bk bed( 
This lemma shows that the only essential conditions are the ‘points of non-density’. 
However, the net consist.ing of the events of S and all essential conditions will not in 
general be mapped onto S by 5. Indeed, considering, for instance, t 
event structure associated with the rationals shows that it is even possible for no 
condition to be essential. 
We leave it, for the moment, to the reader to see how the causal dependency and 
the con~u:~c~:~:y relation of causal nets translate nicely into our event and lattice 
structures. We shall 1001~~ closer into t&5 in the next section. 
eme nets 
From a computational point of view, all the structures introctzced in Section 2 lack 
the important notion of conflict, branching or non-determinism. This is *lot inherent 
in either of our th tories, and in this section we shall see a nice partial correspondence 
between their different ways of treating conflict. 
Witbin net theory higher levei nets may h.ave (forward or br?ck*ard) conflicts. 
Essentially this means that the subprocess ‘caused by’ or ‘causing’ an event or a 
condition is no longer unique. Net theory includes a thorough treatment of conflicts, 
ir;ain!y at the system level of transition nets. The process level semantics of a 
transition net is the class of causal nets it unfolds into, where all the choices 
associated with such an unfolding are ‘made by the environment’ [ll‘J. However, 
from a computational point of view, we would prefer to deal with conflicts at the 
semantical level, and to express the meaning of a system with conflicts in one 
semantical object. We deliberately want to stay as close to causal nets as possible, 
looking for a cl;ass of nets with conflicts on a slightly higher level than causal nets. 
Grsphically, thi:s means that we may want to allow nets with the structures pictured in 
Fig. 5. 
Th,: intuition behind these structures is as follows: 
- forwards co.y%cr+s : from the holding of bl either et or e; (but not both!) may 
occur, in either case with t2-e same effect as in causal nets; 
- ha&wards co&ts : the ho1 ave begun from an occurrence of e2 or 
axi(~~~~tis~ a netion of co 
out forwards conflict. 
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forwards conflict backwards conflict 
Fig. 5. 
Definition 10. Let N = (B, .E, F) be a Petri net satisfying A5-A7. For any a E: B CJ E, 
let a- denote the subset of E defined by 
a- =&f (e E E 1 eF*a ). 
Two events el and e2 are said to be in direct conflict, 
er # l~ei iff el # er and ‘er n ‘e2 # 8. 
Two elements of B u E, Q 1 and UZ, are said to be in conflict, 
ur#~fz;? iff3el,e;!EE;(e*E(Xr)h(e2Ea2)h(e,#INe2). 
Definition 111. A Petri net N is a (forwards conflict) occavence nrec iff it satisfies 
ASA and 
A4’ # N is irreflexive. 
Occurrence nets will be our new class of semantical nets. Elernents of E and B still 
represent unique occurrences and/ holdings, respectively, and A$’ guarantees that no 
event (or condition) is in conflict with itself (can occur on zwo different branches of 
the computation, so to speak), More importantly, the concept of concurrency carries 
over nicely: 
For an occurrence net N = (B, E, F), the ct~ncurrency relation caN G 
E) is defined by 
coIV = def(@ u ))\(F’u CF+)-” u # PI). 
The followilrg proposition is an immediate consequence of our defin;tions. 
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QW 3. Let N = (B, E, F) be an occurrence net. 7%~ CON is symmetrical and 
pflexive. Ftirthermore, any two elements of B v E are related in one of the three 
mutually exclusive ways: causally dependent, concurrent or in conflict. 
It should be noted that our occurrence nets have very little to do with the 
occurrencE: structures defined by Holt [4]. Any causal net is an ~(‘currence net 
according to our definition. 
Before introducing branching in our other theories, let us briefly illustrate how 
occurrence nets do describe the semantics of transition nets the way we wanted. We 
shall only give a brief introduction to transition nets -’ those readers not familiar with 
the theory are referred to [lo]. 
A transition net N in the following is a finite Petri net with a dynaml,: behaviour. 
The conditions of N are called places, and the events transitions. The behaviour of N 
is defined in terms of its markings and the firing rule. A marking is a subset of places, 
usually represented by a token distribution (one tbken on every place in the 
marking). Markings of N may change dynamically via firings 3f transitions. A 
t! ansition t may fire in a particL-lar marking M iff ‘t EI M and t’ c .ef = ld. A firing of t 
will lead to a new marking ’ - (&f\-t) u t-. 
In the following we shall assume that N has associated with it an initial marking&, 
and rile behaviour we are interested in is the “token game” you can play from MO as 
defined above. The set of markirgs you can get into playing this game Fran: MO is 
called the set of reachable markings. 
Furthermore, we shall assume that /V is contact-free (l-safe), thst is fcr sny 
reachable marking M and transition t, ‘t E M implies t’n M = 8. 
The idea behind our semantics of transition: nets is that the behaviour of N will be 
described by an occurrence net with precise11 one condition for each residence of a 
token on a place, and precisely one event for each firing possible for N. A particular 
finite (sequential) behaviour of N is given by a sequence 
u =iw&M~t, - ’ ' t, +1, (*I 
where the M’s are markings, Iw, is the initial marking, the ti’s transitions, and 
ViSn: (‘tiEMi)fi~(A4i+l=( 
Notice that we have assumed contact freeness. A particular firing of a transition, tn, 
may now be identified with a certain equivalence class of sequences of this form. The 
equivalence wili abstract away from the ordering of concurrent firings of transitions. 
Take a sequence of the form (*), and assume there exists an i s n - 1 suc;h that 
‘ti g -1 (and hence ‘ti CT ‘ti- 
( r = ‘l’d), where 
I= fd). Then ‘U represents tk: same firing as a” 
, 
U= I ti 
at 0-I i.s of tbe form 1*). If ‘t, C 
e firing as 0-n’ (a = ( 
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where 
is the unique marking guaranteeing that CT” is of the form (*). 
Now, let = denote the reflexive, symmetrical and transitive; closure of (=(l) w =(*‘), 
and let, for any g of the form (*,I* [o] denote the equivalence class of cr with respect o 
=. Basically, equivalence under = is the same kind of abstraction from orderings of 
concurrent firings as introduced in [7] for a different purpose. 
It is easy to see that each element of an equivalence class has a unique fina! 
transition, and hence we may identify these equivalence classes witb firings of the 
transition net. So, a firing is represented by ‘the tokera game histcry that caused it’, 
and the events of our semantical occurrence net, E, will be this set of equivalence 
classes. Residences of tokens on places are then represented by the set 
B = {(e, p) 1 e E E is a firing of transition t, and tht: place p belongs to t’} 
u m, P) I P E MJ. 
And finally, the F relation of our semzztical net will be 
- (e, b) E F ifl there exists a @ace p of N such that b = (e, p}; 
- (b, e) E F i4 either b = ([M&-, * - - t,,-&f,], p), e = [A&, - - * tn_lMn~,,lkfn+l] and 
p E ‘t,, or elLti b = (0, p), e = [MOtJ4J and p E ‘to. 
efinition 13. Let N be a finite, contact-free transition net with initial marking MO. 
Then OIN, A&] denotes the Petri net defined by the construction given above. 
For any finite contact-free transiticrrr net N with initial markiq MO, 
O[N, A&-,] satisfies the axioms for occurrence nets. The map f, defined below, from 
B u E to places and transitions of N is a folding 191: 
f(@, pi) = f ((e9 P)) = 8, 
In Fig 6 a transition net N with initial marking is pictured with the occurrence net 
constructed from N. 
Let us now see how branching is handled in our other theories. Since elementary 
event structures were our ‘poorest’ structures, it is not surprising that the only way of 
introducing branching is by adding structure. 
. An event structure is a triple $ = (E, S, # ), where 
El (E, G) is an elementary event structure, 
F2 f is a symmetrical and irreflexive relation in E, called the conflict rc~~t~o 
Vel, e2, e3 E E: el3e2 # e3 3 f’l # e3. 
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Fig. 6. 
W% these generalisations of causal nets and elementary Tvent structures, the qext 
two tl..,orems provide straightforward generalisatiopo f the mappings 5 and q and 
the results of Theorems 1 andi 2. 
Let N = (B, E, F) be m occurrence ne!‘. Then 
Pl?Jl =d-f (E, F* r E2, # N 6’ E2) 1s an e?i??‘f ~~ii&d!~re. 
The irrefkxivity of # N follows from A4’. Then E2 follows from the 
be an event structwe (wiih E # 8). Then there is an 
e 7% e’). 
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The events of I#] are obviously those of E, and t e set of conditions is defirres !~y 
={(e,x)(eEE,xECIE,andWe’Ex: ese’) 
p x) 1 x E CE, x nonempty). 
Finally, the F relation is defined as 
F = {((e, x), e’) 1 (e, x) E 
u {Ml, x),4 I@, 4 E B, e’ E -4 
It follows that v[S] is a well-defined occurrence net for which # 1 = # = # 9 and 
hence e[q[S]] = S. 
This construction of n[S] may seem more unnecessarily complicated than the F, GZ 
from the proof of Theorem 2. Obviously, many simpler ones would do; however, we 
have again chosen a ‘maximal’ construction, in the sense that any condition in any 
occurrence net N for which [[N] = S has a representative in q[S] (which means that 
our treatment of conditions in elementary event structures discussed in Section 2 
carries over to event structures). 
Things get a bit more interesting when we move on to our lattice structures and 
generalisations of the mappings 3 and 9. Intuitively, an event structure rqoresents a 
class of processes, where e # e’ means that e and e’ never occur in the same process. 
So, not all left-closed subsets of an event structure make sense as information points. 
Only the conflict f?Ge left-closed subsets can be the sets of occurrences at somre stage 
of an associated process. 
Definition 1%. Let S = (E, G, # ) be G* evzrat structure, and let x be a subset of iE. 
Then x is corzjlict free iff 
We, e’E x: 7(e # e’). 
Our idea about the ordering of information points is still the same, thou&. 
6. Let S= (E, 6, #) be an event structure. Then flS] is the partial 
order of left-closed (w.r.t. G) and conflict free subsets of E, ordered by inclusicrn. 
What about our charactrisation of the structures .Z[§]? Obviously, we do not any 
longer get complete lattices. Two points will be inconsistent (have no upper bound) 
s sets of events) contains con ict. But any consistent set o 
ir ~~~on)~ so t e structures will be consistently co 
e even stronger co 
E61), 
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Let (D, c) be a partial o’rder. A subset x of _D is pairwise consistent iff 
any two of its elements have an upper bound in D; (D, s) is said to be coherent iff 
every pairwise consistent subset of D has a lub. The consistency relation is denoted t ; 
+ denotes inconsistency. 
Let S = (E, 6, #) be an event structure. Then A!?[S] is a prime algebraic 
coherent q;hhl order. Its complete primes are those elements of the form [e] =deP fe’ E 
Ele’Ge}. 
roof. Let X ~dp[§] be pairwise consistent. Then ~Jx is conflict free, and so 
= l_j X, showing that SS] is coherent. 
The rest of the proof proceeds as in the proof of Theorem 3, noting that all 
elements of the form [e] are conflict free from E2, and that for any x rn Z[S] the set 
{[el i e E x} is pairwise consistent. 
From this theorem wt see how to generalise the mapping 8. 
Let P = (D, lo) be a prime algebraic coherent partial order. Then :p[P] 
is defined as the event structure (%&- G, #), where s: is L restricted to VP, and for all 
e, ebE Wp: e # e’ iff e and e’ are inconsistent in P. 
It is easy to see :%a4 9[P] is indeed an event structure, and we .are now ready to 
prove the equ&lr”nce between event structures and prime algebraic coherent partial 
orders corresponding tcl Theorem 4. An isomorphism between two event structures 
is naturally any one to one and onto mapping, which respects :nd reflects both 
causality an cl conflict. 
Let S = (E, s, #) be an event structwz, then S ~5 Y[Af[S]]. Gtu’larly let 
P = (D, E) be cir~ y pn me algebraic coherent partial order, then P G= fl9[P]]. 
roof. Define + : S + P[2’[S]] by $(e) = [e]. It follows along the lines of the proof of 
hcorem 4 that + is 2n isomorphism with respect o G and the correspor&ng relation 
in 4”[%‘[S]]. Furthermore, # is easily seen to respect and reflect the con.;liict relation. 
ping :K as defined in kemrr 1 is known to be an order manic from AP to 
%‘g, @] (from Lnama 1). By definition Z[g[P]] is a subordering of 
~[WP, c 1 %g, @)I, so all we have to prove is that the range of n- is equal to the set of 
elements of Z[p[P]], i.e. for every left-closed set, X, of co lete primes of P: 
dE p’ are consistent. 
me the rivet-ban side assumption. 
plies the exlst~~cc Q it follows that 
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In Pig. 7 an occurrence net .!++I is pictured with its ass,ociated event structure ([IV] 
and the coherent prime algebraic partial order J?‘[e[N 13. 
So, we have now established a complete generalisation of the picture from the 
previous section: 
Our considerations about translation oi events and conditions work just like in 
Section 2. Formally, Proposition 2 and Theorem 5 hold for prime algebraic coiherent 
partial orders, 
Restricting ourselves to these relations on events, the correspondences, as shown 
in Table 1, now be obvious to the reader. 
Finally, let us see what these relations look like in terms of prime intervals of 
partial orders. 













F+ rE2 < sra’p 
#IV FE2 # tw2p 
E’\(F+ u (F”)-’ u # ~1 E*\<(u) u # :i a;\& u 3 4) 
iti 9. Let B = (D, E) be a prime algebraic coherent partial order. The 
relalion + (‘may occ... dir before’) on %$ is defined as follows: p1 -+- p2 iff there exist 
crime intervals of B, [xl, x 11: [x2, xi 3, such that pr([xl, xi 1) = pl, pr([x2, xi]) = p2 and 
x 1 c x2. The complement of -+- is denoted +. 
MI 5. Let P = (0, C) be a prime algebraic coherent partial otder, and tct ~1, 
p2~ %P, PI #PZ. Then 
Pl c P2 iff (p1+p2) A (pi! -f-PI), 
Pl;tP2iff(glf~2)n(P2~pl). 
and hence p1 and p2 are concurrent ifl ( p: - ~2) A (112 +-PI). 
So far we have provided techniques to show ho 1 J, for instance, the notion of an 
event translates into domains. In part II we shall develop these further dealing with 
more sophisticated concepts such as state, of a computation and confusion in detail. 
However, now we have enough machine] y to connect confusion freeness in finite 
contact-free transition nets with concrete domains. Indee? an equivalent of con- 
Iusion freeness was rediscovered in the work of Kahn and Plotkin on concrete 
dcr,mains [S] without their knowing it at the time. We set down some basic facts ir? 
Let N be a finite contact-free tranMon net with initiul marking, MO, 
Each finite behavinur determines a finite element of .Yo 6 0 O[.V, 
reo3er there is a 3. - 1 correspondence between finite sequential behaviours and finite 
ins of coverings from fd in 2 0 40 O[N, +1 corresponding 
to 
B -X ev( 
us ev is orito finite elerrnents and I[e]j < a~ for all occurrences e.) 
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We now give the definition of confusion for finite contact-free transition nets [If;]. 
Let N be a finite contact-free transition net with initial marking, MO. 
is symmetrically confused tff there are a re:achable marking and 
transitions t, t’, t” such that (2, ‘t’, ‘t”sM) A (‘t n’t’ # 8) A (‘t’n’t” # 0) A (2 n’t” = 8). 
Further, (N, A&) is asymmetrically conjtised iff there are a reachable miarking R4 
and transitions t, t’, t” such that (‘t, ‘t”‘c M) A (‘t’s M) A (‘t’s (Mvt) v t’) A 
(‘t n*t” = fl) A (‘t’n-t” #@). 
Finally, (N, M-J is confused iff N is symmetrically or asymmetrically confused; 
otherwise (N, M-J is said to be confusion-free. 
In Nr of Fig. 8 the conflict between t and t’ may be resolved by the occurrence of b”, 
In N2, t’ and t” may be brought into conflict by the occurrence of f. 
N1 - symmetric confusion 
Fig. 8. 
N2 - asymmetric confusion 
_=- 
We remind the reader that axiom Q of concrete domains takes the followSng form 
(the elements are understood to be in a c.p.0.): 
Q Z+-XEyAZfy+‘i!!t:X-<tGyAZj?. 
‘Thus axiom Q has two parts, an existence part saying ‘3 t - - a’> and a uniquen css part 
saying there is only one such t. The following proof demonstrates that these two parts 
correspond to banning asymmetric and symmetric confusion respectively. 
be a finite contact-free tramition net with initial 
) is confusion free e 9 0 e 0 O[ 
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. Suppose (I++& ) is confused. Then it is either symmetrically or asymmetric- 
a!!y confused. ‘In the first case 
‘: /-I ‘f’ # 8 A ‘t’rr .f” f $5 A ‘t A ‘t” = 0 
for some, transitions t, t’, t” and some reachable marking e use the above 
roposition to translate this set-up into the domain. ‘rake x to b e finite element Iof 
associated with the finite behav:iour up to arid e, e’, e” the 
occurrences e transitions t, t’, t” frolm it . . TJsing P.roposition 6 we get the picture of 
Fig. 9(a) in 2’0 c 0 O[N, lY whick contradicts the uniqtieness part of axiom 
Q - take 
y = x u {e, e”)9 z =xu{e’). 
ilar way the second case yields the picture of Fig. 9(b) in 2? J e 0 O[N, MO], 
which contradicts the existence part of axiom Q -take 
y = x u {e, e’), z =x u{e”}. 







For t.he lconllerse suppose axiom Q fails to hold. This can happen in two ways; 
either tile uniq geness part fails, or the existence part fails. In the second case 
3X, jI_, Z E 2 O g O l0[!V, A&]: z >--xyAzryA~tr”t:x-<tey3ttz, 
We therefore have z = x u {e} and e # e’ for some occurrences e’ E y and e. We may 
suppose e’ is a:-minimal in y such that e # e’. Our hypothesis is maintained if we 
redefine 
x = Ee l\kI, 
Now ‘we take a -eve 
= (8). ‘fhls 
z =[c], y = [e’] 1 .I [e]\(e). 
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x n_l u I4 x ncx “_, u le’? 
Fig. 10. 
Corrrl”~y 1. Let N be a finite contact-free transition net with initial marking MO. Then 
iN, bA\ :s confusion-free e 2’ 0 5: 0 O[N, MO] is a distributive concrete domam. 
rapof. The theorem settles axiom Q. We know .Z 0 5 0 OIN, MD] is distributive by 
the work of Section 3. Axioms C and R follow from distributivity and axiom F from 
[e] being finite for all occurrences e. The fact that 2’ 0 8 0 OlN, A&] is w-algebraic 
follows from N being finite. 
Axiom Q evolved from the intuitions of Kahn and Plotkin ia their work on 
concrete datatypes. There an event is imagined ts occur at a fixed point in space and 
time; confltct between events is localised in that two conflicting events are enabled at 
the same time and are competing for the same point in space and time. 
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